This study examines audit pricing in an emerging audit market characterized by increasing competition but segmented by the continued presence of a government audit firm, and the exclusion of international audit firms. Using traditional audit fee modeling, we find that: (1) despite the absence of international “brand names”, audit firm size or market power remains associated with audit fee premium; (2) companies precluded from switching to a private sector pay a fee premium to the quasi-monopolistic audit firm. This study extends the audit pricing literature by identifying the extent of discretionary pricing relative to variations in auditor competition.
Azizkhani, M. and Kavoosi, M. (2017). The Pricing of Auditor Market Power: Evidence from Iran. Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1(1), -. doi: 10.22067/ijaaf.v1i1.69652
MLA
Azizkhani, M. , and Kavoosi, M. . "The Pricing of Auditor Market Power: Evidence from Iran", Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1, 1, 2017, -. doi: 10.22067/ijaaf.v1i1.69652
HARVARD
Azizkhani, M., Kavoosi, M. (2017). 'The Pricing of Auditor Market Power: Evidence from Iran', Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1(1), pp. -. doi: 10.22067/ijaaf.v1i1.69652
CHICAGO
M. Azizkhani and M. Kavoosi, "The Pricing of Auditor Market Power: Evidence from Iran," Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1 1 (2017): -, doi: 10.22067/ijaaf.v1i1.69652
VANCOUVER
Azizkhani, M., Kavoosi, M. The Pricing of Auditor Market Power: Evidence from Iran. Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 2017; 1(1): -. doi: 10.22067/ijaaf.v1i1.69652
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