This study examines audit pricing in an emerging audit market characterized by increasing competition but segmented by the continued presence of a government audit firm, and the exclusion of international audit firms. Using traditional audit fee modeling, we find that: (1) despite the absence of international “brand names”, audit firm size or market power remains associated with audit fee premium; (2) companies precluded from switching to a private sector pay a fee premium to the quasi-monopolistic audit firm. This study extends the audit pricing literature by identifying the extent of discretionary pricing relative to variations in auditor competition.
Azizkhani, M., & Kavoosi, M. (2017). The Pricing of Auditor Market Power: Evidence from Iran. Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1(1), -. doi: 10.22067/ijaaf.v1i1.69652
MLA
Masoud Azizkhani; Mina Kavoosi. "The Pricing of Auditor Market Power: Evidence from Iran", Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1, 1, 2017, -. doi: 10.22067/ijaaf.v1i1.69652
HARVARD
Azizkhani, M., Kavoosi, M. (2017). 'The Pricing of Auditor Market Power: Evidence from Iran', Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1(1), pp. -. doi: 10.22067/ijaaf.v1i1.69652
VANCOUVER
Azizkhani, M., Kavoosi, M. The Pricing of Auditor Market Power: Evidence from Iran. Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 2017; 1(1): -. doi: 10.22067/ijaaf.v1i1.69652
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