The Relationship between Supervisory Independence and Auditor’s Opinion Shopping: Market Competition influence

Document Type : Original Article


1 Department of Management, Economics and Accounting, Payamenoor University, Tehran, Iran

2 Department of Accounting, Imam Reza University, Mashhad, Iran


It is stated in the financial reporting literature that companies in a competitive industry will pursue better disclosure policies. On the other hand, Product market competition substitutes internal governance that reduces agency costs. This study investigates the effect of product market competition on the relationship between the supervisory independence of the firm and the auditor’s opinion on shopping. In this study, four methods have been considered to determine the occurrence of opinion shopping. It is assumed that opinion shopping occurs when one of these four conditions is met. The study sample includes 162 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2014–2019. Research hypotheses were tested by using logistic regression analyses. The results show that if the auditor's opinion shopping criterion is the ratio of the amount of restatement of financial statements to income, the board's independence has a negative and significant relationship with the auditor’s opinion shopping. The research findings also show that the audit committee's independence was not related to the auditor’s opinion shopping criteria. Also, separate tests on the role of product market competition on the above relationships indicate that this variable does not have moderator effects.


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