Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance

Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance

The Impact of The Revolving Door Phenomenon on the Financial Performance

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Hadi Shafii Dizaji
Gholamreza Mansourfar
Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economic & Management, Urmia University, Urmia, Iran
10.22067/ijaaf.2026.47562.1553
Abstract
Due to the societal scrutiny of banks' financial performance and concerns about conflicts of interest arising from the revolving door phenomenon among senior bank managers, this study addresses a critical gap in the literature by examining the impact of the revolving door on the performance of Iran's state-owned banks. Although most studies have concentrated on developed economies, few have examined this phenomenon in developing countries with centralized banking systems, such as Iran. Using data from nine state-owned banks over 20 years (2002–2021), the study incorporated a dummy variable from Athanasoglou et al. (2009) into the model to capture the movement of managers and board members between the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and state-owned banks. The results revealed that none of the variables adjusted for the revolving door have a significant relationship with the dependent variable, return on assets. Thus, the revolving door phenomenon did not significantly affect bank performance in this context, suggesting that managerial transitions between the Central Bank and state-owned banks did not inherently lead to conflicts of interest. These findings called into question prevailing theoretical claims regarding the detrimental consequences of the revolving-door phenomenon and underscore the need to reassess governance frameworks within highly focused banking systems.
Keywords
Bank Managers
Conflict of Interest, Revolving Door Phenomenon
Subjects
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